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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Frederick Allen Hileman appeals from his judgment of conviction for lewd 
conduct with a minor under the age of sixteen. He asserts that the district court erred in 
admitting I.R. 404(b) evidence against him because the probative value of the 
evidence is entirely dependent upon its tendency to demonstrate the defendant's 
propensity to engage in such behavior. Further, even if relevant, its probative value was 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Anne Pennell and Kenneth Pennell had two children together S.P. who was 11 
at the time of trial, and J.P., who was 9 at the time of trial. (Trial Tr., p.167, Ls.1-21.) 
Ms. Pennell also had three other children - S.S., age 32, J.E., age 20, and K.E., age 17. 
(Trial Tr., p.167, L.25 - p.168, L.2) S.S. had three children; Mr. Hileman was the father 
of two of them. (Trial Tr., p.169, Ls.10-25.) In 2010 Ms. Pennell and her children S.P., 
J.P., and J.E moved in with S.S. and Mr. Hileman for several months. (Trial Tr., p.172, 
Ls.1-13.) 
S.S. and Mr. Hileman eventually divorced, but Ms. Pennell would still see him 2 
to 3 times a week when he would pick up the children. (Trial Tr., p.175, Ls.4-7.) 
On March 12, 2012, J.P. came home from school and reported that "something 
had happened to her and someone had touched her." (Trial Tr., p.176, Ls.3-7.) 
Ms. Pennell called the police and J.P. was taken to CARES. (Trial Tr., p.184, Ls.16-22.) 
Joseph Even is the father of S.S., J.E., and K.E. (Trial Tr., p.186, Ls.1-18.) He 
remained friends with Mr. Hileman after Mr. Hileman divorced S.S. (Trial Tr., p.193, 
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Ls.10-18.) On April 2, 2012, Mr. Hileman contacted Mr. Even and informed him that he 
was under investigation "for ticking [J.P.]'s bottom." (Trial Tr., p.195, Ls.6-23.) 
Mr. Even also understood that Mr. Hileman was being investigated for touching J.E. 
(Trial Tr., p.196, Ls.2-4.) Mr. Even saw Mr. Hileman around children many times and 
never noticed any inappropriate behavior. (Trial Tr., p.197, Ls.15-22.) 
After J.P.'s CARES interview, Ms. Pennell spoke with Detective Sean Stace, and 
expressed concern about Mr. Hileman's behavior toward her other daughters, K.E. and 
J.E. (Trial Tr., p.205, Ls.2-5.) Detective Stace then made arrangements to meet with 
Mr. Hileman, "to get his side of the story." (Trial Tr., p.206, Ls.11-13.) 
Detective Stace spoke with Mr. Hileman on March 30, 2012; Mr. Hileman was 
aware that he was being investigated for touching the girls and he stated that he had no 
idea why they were making these allegations. (Trial Tr., p.209, Ls.1-4.) However, with 
regard to K.E., Mr. Hileman "admitted that there had been an exchange via text 
previously between he and her where she had asked him to buy some alcohol for her 
and her friends, ad he said no. He told me that she persisted, and so he told her that he 
would buy her the alcohol if he showed him her breasts." (Trial Tr., p.209, L.23 - p.210, 
L.4.) However, he said that he did not buy the alcohol and she never showed him her 
breasts. (Trial Tr., p.210, Ls.13-16.) He also stated that one time he had rubbed J.E.'s 
legs and feet but stopped when he believed he may have been "crossing the line." 
(Trial Tr., p.212, Ls.18-25.) 
Detective Stace then scheduled another interview for April 3rd . (Trial Tr., p.215, 
Ls.1-5.) The recording of this interview was played for the jury. (Trial Tr., p.218, Ls.5-9; 
State's Exhibit 2.) During this interview, Mr. Hileman volunteered K.H. and S.G.'s 
names. (Trial Tr., p.222, Ls.2-12.) He also made incriminating statements regarding all 
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of the alleged victims. Detective Stace then asked Mr. Hileman to return on April 10th in 
order to discuss Mr. Hileman's sexual history. (Trial Tr., p.223, Ls.8-13.) 
When Detective Stace obtained the history, he scheduled another meeting for 
the following day. (Trial Tr., p.227, Ls.11-16.) Recordings of this interview were played 
for the jury. (Trial Tr., p.230, Ls.4-6; State's Exhibits 4 and 5.) Mr. Hileman made 
incriminating statements during this interview. 
J.P. testified that Mr. Hileman had touched her inappropriately. (Trial Tr., p.254, 
Ls.8-17.) She testified that when she was nine years old, Mr. Hileman tickled her on her 
bottom, "kind of where" she peed. (Trial Tr., p.258, Ls.9-21.) She initially did not tell 
anyone but decided to tell her mother after watching a video at school. (Trial Tr., p.260, 
Ls.4-24.) 
S.G. testified that she used to babysit for Mr. Hileman and S.S. (Trial Tr., p.270, 
Ls.4-24.) She was around 10 years old at the time. (Trial Tr., p.273, Ls.4-7.) She 
testified that one time, after Mr. Hileman had returned home, he asked her to come 
sleep in his room; according to S.G., Mr. Hileman touched her genitals for about 15 
minutes. (Trial Tr., p.277, L.4 - p.278, L. 5.) She never reported the incident and never 
told anyone until after the police contacted her mother. (Trial Tr., p.279, Ls.8-22.) 
J.E. testified that on one night, after going to the movies, Mr. Hileman began 
rubbing her while she was on the couch; she got uncomfortable and went upstairs. 
(Trial Tr., p.293, L.12 - p.294, L.19.) He followed her upstairs where, according to J.E., 
he pulled up the blanket and starting touching her butt. (Trial Tr., p.296, Ls.1-3.) 
K.H. testified that Mr. Hileman was a family friend; her mother and his wife had 
known each other for a long time. (Trial Tr., p.304, Ls.1-5.) She testified that 
Mr. Hileman touched her breasts every time he would babysit her when she was 
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between 7 and 11. (Trial Tr., p.307, Ls.14-22.) She never reported the incidents and 
never reported it to anyone until after the police contacted her mother. (Trial Tr., p.309, 
Ls.16-29.) 
K. E. testified that she had indeed asked Mr. Hileman to buy alcohol for her and 
her friends and that he said he would if she showed him her breasts. (Trial Tr., p.318, 
L.5 - p.319, L.25.) She agreed that he never bought the alcohol and she never showed 
him her breasts. (Trial Tr., p.320, Ls.1-20.) 
Mr. Hileman was charged with three counts of lewd conduct with a minor under 
the age of sixteen and two counts of sex abuse of a child under the age of sixteen. 
(R., p.9.) 
Prior to trial, the State filed a notice of intent to use I.R.E. 404(b) evidence. 
(R., p.64.) The State sought to introduce the following evidence: Mr. Hileman's 
statements that 1) "he does not trust himself around girls so he keeps his distance;" 2) 
"his trouble with girls began when he was a juvenile and used to inappropriately touch 
his younger sister;" 3) "he has had inappropriate thoughts about little girls;" 4) "he was 
ashamed of the things has done and thought of [re: little girls];" and 5) "when he 
wrestled with girls he has had to say 'no' [due] to the sexual thoughts he has had 
because 'that's not right."' (R., pp.64-65.) Further, the State sought to introduce 
evidence that Mr. Hileman admitted to trying to have intercourse with his sister, digitally 
penetrating his sister's vagina, placing his mouth on her vagina, and to sexually 
touching his cousin. (R., p.65.) Finally, the State sought to introduce evidence that 
Mr. Hileman said that he was "fascinated with girls going through the change to become 
women." (R., p.65.) 
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At the hearing on the motion in limine, the State acknowledged that the incidents 
regarding Mr. Hileman's sister and cousin were likely inadmissible and withdrew them 
from the motion. (Tr., p.32, Ls.1-8.) Regarding the other statements, however, the 
State asserted that these, "were relevant to show [Mr.] Hileman's intent at time that he 
was committing these acts; that they do have probative value that is not substantially 
outweighed by any prejudicial value." (Tr., p.32, Ls.20-25.) 
Counsel for Mr. Hileman, while acknowledging that "intent is certainly relevant 
and at issue," asserted that, "these comments are kind of general, and I think they come 
down to more propensity." (Tr., p.33, Ls.9-16.) Counsel acknowledged that, "specific 
statements of what his intent was with the actual victims, certainly that becomes 
relevant because the intent is certainly relevant. But when it gets this general, it's more 
propensity." (Tr., p.33, Ls.17-25.) 
The district court granted the State's motion with regarding to the remaining 
statements, holding, 
It appears to me that these statements, as amended, are relevant to the 
issue of intent, and I think they are potentially probative. Well, not 
potentially. They would be probative of the defendant's state of mind in 
taking whatever actions he took as reflected by the evidence at the time. 
So while they do have an element of propensity about them, with almost 
anything going towards intent or which might tend to prove intent, you 
have that same issue. 
Here I don't believe that that potential confusion is very high. I think it 
does clearly go to intent. If requested by the state - or by - I'm sorry - by 
the defense, I would give a limiting instruction essentially advising the jury 
that it is limited to determining intent, not to be used to show the 
defendant's propensity to commit any illegal acts or something of that 
nature. I would like to see the defendant's proposed instruction, if the 
defense wants one. 
(Tr., p.37, L.25 - p.38, L.21.) At trial, Detective Stace testified to Mr. Hileman's 
statements, stating, 
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He mentioned that he didn't trust his judgment, that for sometime he had 
done his best to keep his distance from girls. He - when it was clarified 
about potentially having some issues with women, he clarified and said, no, 
girls. 
When I asked what kind of scenarios, he talked about wrestling, that he 
had had thoughts about possibly grabbing breasts because that was an 
issue for him but, because of that, he keep[s] his distance and tries to stay 
out of those scenarios. 
(Trial Tr., p.212, Ls.2-11.) 
Mr. Hileman was convicted following a jury trial. (R., pp.155-59.) The district 
court imposed concurrent unified sentences of twelve years, with five years fixed. 
(R., p.167.) Mr. Hileman appealed. (R., p.171.) He asserts that the district court erred 
by admitting improper 404(b) evidence. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err by admitting improper 404(b) evidence against Mr. Hileman? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Admitted Improper 404(b) Against Mr. Hileman 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Hileman asserts that the district court erred in admitting I.RE. 404(b) 
evidence against him because the probative value of the evidence was entirely 
dependent upon its tendency to demonstrate the defendant's propensity to engage in 
such behavior. Further, even if relevant, its probative value was substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 
B. Standard Of Review 
This Court reviews a district court's determination to admit evidence for an abuse 
of discretion. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51 (2009). The review for an abuse of 
discretion involves resolution of three issues: (1) whether the district court correctly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the district court acted within the 
outer bounds of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards; and (3) 
whether the district court reached its decision through an exercise of reason. Id. Upon 
review of the district court's determination to admit prior bad acts evidence pursuant to 
I.RE. 404(b), this Court reviews the district court's relevancy determination de novo. 
See State v. Rossignol, 147 Idaho 818, 824 (Ct. App. 2009). The district court's 
balancing of the potential for prejudice against the probative value of the evidence is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Grist, 147 Idaho at 52. 
Further, "[w]here a defendant alleges error at trial that he contemporaneously 
objected to, this Court reviews the error on appeal under the harmless error test. 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222 (2010). "A defendant appealing from an objected-
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to, non-constitutionally-based error shall have the duty establish that such an error 
occurred, at which point the State shall have the burden of demonstrating that the error 
is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (emphasis added). 
C. The District Court Erred When It Admitted Improper 404(b) Against Mr. Hileman 
The Idaho Rules of Evidence provide that, generally speaking, evidence of "other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to 
show that the person acted in conformity therewith." I.R.E. 404(b). However, such 
evidence may be admitted "for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident .... " 
Id. 
Under I.R.E. 404(b), there is a two-tiered analysis for determining the 
admissibility of "prior bad act" evidence. Grist, 147 Idaho at 52. The court must first 
"determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish the other crime or wrong as 
fact" and "whether the fact of another crime or wrong, if established, would be relevant . 
. . to a material and disputed issue concerning the crime charged, other than 
propensity." Id. (emphasis added). If the evidence is insufficient to establish the other 
crime or wrong as fact, or if the other crime or wrong, even if proven, is not relevant to 
an issue other than character or propensity, it is inadmissible and the inquiry ends. See 
id. However, if the evidence is sufficient to prove the other crime or wrong, and that 
crime or wrong is relevant to some valid issue, the court must then "engage in a 
balancing under I.RE. 403 and determine whether the danger of unfair prejudice 
substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence." Id. 
In Grist, the Idaho Supreme Court criticized the rationale from State v. Moore, 
120 Idaho 743 (1991), stating that the Court's explanation in that case could have just 
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as easily been stated as follows: "If the defendant has committed another sex offense, 
it is more probable that he committed the offense for which he is charged, thus reducing 
the probability that the prosecuting witness is lying, while at the same time increasing 
the probability that the defendant committed the crime." Id. at 54. The unstated premise 
in Moore was that "[i]f he did it before, he probably did it this time as well." Id. Grist held 
that "[t]his complete reliance upon propensity is not a permissible basis for the 
admission of evidence of uncharged misconduct." Id. Thus, the admissibility of 
evidence of prior bad acts hinges on the question of whether "its probative value is 
entirely dependent upon its tendency to demonstrate the defendant's propensity to 
engage in such behavior." Id. 
As set forth above, prior to trial the State filed a notice of intent to use I.RE. 
404(b) evidence. (R., p.64.) The State sought to introduce the following evidence: 
Mr. Hileman's statements that 1) "he does not trust himself around girls so he keeps his 
distance;" 2) "his trouble with girls began when he was a juvenile and used to 
inappropriately touch his younger sister;" 3) "he has had inappropriate thoughts about 
little girls;" 4) "he was ashamed of the things has done and thought of [re: little girls];" 
and 5) "when he wrestled with girls he has had to say 'no' [due] to the sexual thoughts 
he has had because 'that's not right."' (R., pp.64-65.) Further, the State sought to 
introduce evidence that Mr. Hileman admitted to trying to have intercourse with his 
sister, digitally penetrating his sister's vagina, placing his mouth on her vagina, and to 
sexually touching his cousin. (R., p.65.) Finally, the State sought to introduce evidence 
that Mr. Hileman said that he was "fascinated with girls going through the change to 
become women." (R., p.65.) 
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At the hearing on the motion in limine, the State acknowledged that the incidents 
regarding Mr. Hileman's sister and cousin were likely inadmissible and withdrew them 
from the motion. (Tr., p.32, Ls.1-8.) Regarding the other statements, however, the 
State asserted that these, "were relevant to show [Mr.] Hileman's intent at time that he 
was committing these acts; that they do have probative value that is not substantially 
outweighed by any prejudicial value." (Tr., p.32, Ls.20-25.) 
Counsel for Mr. Hileman, while acknowledging that "intent is certainly relevant 
and at issue," asserted that, "these comments are kind of general, and I think they come 
down to more propensity." (Tr., p.33, Ls.9-16.) Counsel acknowledged that, "specific 
statements of what his intent was with the actual victims, certainly that becomes 
relevant because the intent is certainly relevant. But when it gets this general, it's more 
propensity." (Tr., p.33, Ls.17-25.) 
The district court granted the State's motion with regarding to the remaining 
statements, holding, 
It appears to me that these statements, as amended, are relevant to the 
issue of intent, and I think they are potentially probative. Well, not 
potentially. They would be probative of the defendant's state of mind in 
taking whatever actions he took as reflected by the evidence at the time. 
So while they do have an element of propensity about them, with almost 
anything going towards intent or which might tend to prove intent, you 
have that same issue. 
Here I don't believe that that potential confusion is very high. I think it 
does clearly go to intent. If requested by the state - or by - I'm sorry - by 
the defense, I would give a limiting instruction essentially advising the jury 
that it is limited to determining intent, not to be used to show the 
defendant's propensity to commit any illegal acts or something of that 
nature. I would like to see the defendant's proposed instruction, if the 
defense wants one. 
(Tr., p.37, L.25 - p.38, L.21.) At trial, Detective Sean Stace testified to Mr. Hileman's 
statements, stating, 
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He mentioned that he didn't trust his judgment, that for sometime he had 
done his best to keep his distance from girls. He - when it was clarified 
about potentially having some issues with women, he clarified and said, no, 
girls. 
When I asked what kind of scenarios, he talked about wrestling, that he 
had had thoughts about possibly grabbing breasts because that was an 
issue for him but, because of that, he keep[s] his distance and tries to stay 
out of those scenarios. 
(Trial Tr., p.212, Ls.2-11.) A recording of the interview was also admitted into evidence. 
(Trial Tr., p.218, Ls.8-9; State's Exhibit 2.) 
Mr. Hileman submits that the district court erred because, while intent is relevant, 
the probative value of this evidence is entirely dependent upon its tendency to 
demonstrate the his propensity to engage in such behavior. See Grist, 147 Idaho at 54. 
The State did not assert, and there is no evidence, that Mr. Hileman was referring to 
any of the alleged victims in this case when he discussed the inappropriate thoughts he 
had had earlier. This evidence only demonstrates intent with regard to the current 
charges if the fact that Mr. Hileman had inappropriate thoughts in the past meant that he 
had inappropriate thoughts with regard to the alleged victims in this case. This is the 
definition of propensity and nothing more than the disapproved-of unstated premise of 
Moore - "[i]f he did it before, he probably did it this time as well." Id. at 52. In this case, 
the premise is, "if he had intent before, he probably did this time as well." This is, 
therefore, evidence whose probative value is entirely dependent upon propensity, and 
the district court erred by admitting the State's proposed evidence. 
D. Even If Relevant, The Prejudice Of This Evidence Substantially Outweighed Any 
Potential Probative Value 
Finally, even if relevant, the evidence should have been excluded under I.RE. 
403. Under I.RE. 403, relevant evidence can be excluded by the district court if the 
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probative value of that evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, danger of misleading the jury, or if the evidence 
would involve needless presentation of cumulative evidence. State v. Tapia, 127 Idaho 
249, 254 (1995). This Court reviews the issue of whether the probative value of prior 
bad acts evidence is substantially outweighed by the prejudice of such evidence for an 
abuse of the district court's discretion. See, e.g., State v. Cannady, 137 Idaho 67, 72 
(2002). 
While the district court's calculus of whether the probative value of evidence is 
substantially outweighed by its prejudice is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, this 
discretion is not without limits. As noted by the court in Stoddard: 
This is not a discretion to depart from the principle that evidence of other 
crimes, having no substantial relevancy except to ground the inference 
that [the] accused is a bad man and hence probably committed the crime, 
must be excluded. The leeway of discretion lies rather in the opposite 
direction, empowering the judge to exclude other-crimes evidence, even 
when it has substantial independent relevancy, if in his Judgment its 
probative value for this purpose is outweighed by the danger that it will stir 
such passion in the jury as to sweep them beyond a rational consideration 
of guilt or innocence of the crime on trial. Discretion implies not only 
leeway but responsibility. A decision clearly wrong on this question of 
balancing probative value against danger of prejudice will be corrected on 
appeal as an abuse of discretion. 
State v. Stoddard, 105 Idaho 533, 537, 670 P.2d 1318, 1322 (Ct. App. 1983) (quoting 
McCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW ON EVIDENCE§ 190 (Cleary ed. 1972). 
Evidence of sexual misconduct evidence is indeed highly prejudicial. As Justice 
Bistline wrote in Moore: 
Balancing the prejudice against the probative value is especially vital in 
sex abuse cases where the possibility for unfair prejudice is at its 
highest. 
Once the accused has been characterized as a person of abnormal bent, 
driven by biological inclination, it seems relatively easy to arrive at the 
conclusion that he must be guilty, he could not help but be otherwise. 
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Moore, 120 Idaho at 748 (Bistline, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting 
Slough and Knightly, Other Vices, Other Crimes, 41 lowA L. REV. 325, 333-34 (1956)). 
In this case, even assuming that the evidence is relevant, it was highly prejudicial as it 
did nothing more than to demonstrate that Mr. Hileman was a person of bad character. 
Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when it suggests a decision on an improper basis. See 
State v. Pokorney, 149 Idaho 459, 465 (Ct. App. 2010). Deciding a case based upon 
the defendant's character, as opposed to the conduct that gives rise to the charges, is 
what I.R.E. 404(b) is designed to prevent. Mr. Hileman therefore asserts that the district 
court erred by concluding that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially 
outweighed by unfair prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Hileman requests that his convictions be vacated and his case remanded for 
further proceedings. 
DATED this 22nd day of January, 2014. 
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